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THE NEW PROPERTY
Those of us who are in the federal service often times
~ake

great pride in being associated with

the people, the government.

t~e

protector of

Government is known for its ability

to instantaneously react to a problem and create, over night,
new mechanisms to deal with a perceived wrong.

I could give

you many examples of this characteristic of government; however,
I think that I need give you only a few.
Starting with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
an organization on which I am proud to be a member, it was
established in 1965 to deal with a nationally recognized problem of discrimination in employment based on"race, color, sex,
religion and national origin.

In passing Title VII, Congress
..........

limited the right of an employer to adversely affect one's job
by using the forbidden factors of race, color, sex, religion
or national origin.

Stated in other words, Congress created a

right in the individual not to have his or her job adversely
affected by those forbidden factors.
This same pattern can also be seen in other areas where
laws have forbidden employers from adversely affecting the
employment of individuals based on proscribed factors.

For

example, the Age Discrimination in Emplo¥ment Act forbids an

"-.
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employer from discriminating against an individual because he
or she is between the ages of forty and seventy.

The Equal

Pay Act prohibits an employer from paying women a lower wage
than men for ferfOrming substantially the same work.

The

Rehabilitation Act prohibits certain employers from discriminating against individuals because of handicapp.

The National

Labor Relations Act prohibits an employer from discriminating
against an individual for engaging in certain protected union
activity.

The Occupational Safety and Health Act prohibits an

employer from retaliating against an individual for complaining
about unsafe work situations.
All of these examples, and of course many more, are
situations where laws have limited the unfettered right of
employers to do whatever they please.

Or stated otherwise,

those laws created rights in employees and potential employees
to be free from having their employment adversely affected by
those limited, forbidden factors.
In assuring these statutorily-created rights, Congres-s
created administrative agencies to, in many instances, determine
on a case-by-case basis whether or not an individual's rights
were violated and, upon finding a violation, ordering corrective
action.

Moreover, since the rights created by these statutes

are generally limited, the agencies charged with enforcing
these rights very often have very limited jurisdiction as a consequence.

Therefore, often times the same action may violate

, .
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more than one of these limited rights.

But because the agencies

created have limited authority, often times more than one
investigation may be conducted because' the same action may violate different statutes.
!

On the one'hand, one could call this

multiplicitous action duplication.

Yet, on the other hand it

could be called a natural flaw that flows from a piece-meal
approach to a larger problem.
Although most legislation created to deal with employment
problems fit the mold which I just described, there are other
approaches which blankedly prohibit adverse employment decisions
from being made for other than for good cause.

Two examples

of this approach that readily 'come to mind are union agreements
and civil service laws.

These two, rather than creating many

individual prohibitions like the legislative approach that I
mentioned a short time ago, generally deal with the same types
of concerns in a broader fashion.
The legislative approach can with one stroke of the pen
change the contours of the universe overnight.

The collective

bargaining approach can gradually create rights for its members,
depending on the relative strength of the union vs. management at
any given time.
The judiciary, although slowly, 'often times reacts to
these same changing realities" but in a different

manner~

Unlike,

the legislative 'branch's ability:to sweepingly change the status
on~'~,exception'

quo overnight, the judiciary often· times 'creates
to a general rule at a time.

< :. .:..
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period of time can convert what was an exception to the general
rule into the general rule.
With this in mind, I would like

to now trace the approach

that the judiciary
has taken to the right to the job.
c

At the

common_law, the relationship between employer and "employee was
treated as one of the master and servant.

Master-servant rela-

tions law very early adopted the characteristics of contract law.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the great majority of
American courts by the end of the 19th, century adopted the
rule that an employment with no fixed duration was presumptively
an employment at will, terminable for any or no reason by either
party at any time.

This doctrine, known as Woods law, although

first asserted without analysis or judicial support, was consistent with prevailing lassez-faire notions.
While the rule of free terminability of

employment

~he

relationship was becoming generally accepted, no rule seemed more
certain than a rule of domestic-relations law which held that a
marriage was terminable only for serious cause.

The contrast" '.

between the rule regarding the termination of a.marriage'and the
one concerning termination of employment becomes more startling
upon reflecting on the fact that both relationships were governed
by the same domestic retations rules at one point.
Amazingly, the rules regarding termination of employment
and termination of a marriage have crisscross again.
is now' terminable by either spouse at will in
states,

whil~most

t~e

Marriage

\"

majority of '

employees in the labor force can be discharged
..
",'

only for cause.
,

'.

I

•
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The erosion of the rule that employment is terminable by
either party for any or no reason at any time can be seen in
several cases during the last several decades.
A.

Public Policy Exception

one of the first exceptions to the free terminability rule
was articulated in the case of Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App 2d 184, 344 p. 2d 25 (1959).

In

Petermann, a former business agent of the Teamsters Union brought
a wrongful discharge suit against his employer-union, alleging
that he had been fired because of his refusal to commit perjury
at this employer's request.

The California- Court of Appeal held

that Petermann had stated a claim for relief and that considerations of public policy might limit the employer's right to discharge an employee.

This exception of the free terminability

rule_ is referred to as the public policy exception.
B.

Abandoning the General Rule

Wpi1e some courts have attempted to soften the harshness
of the rule of free terminability by creating limited exceptions -to the general rule, others have attempted to _rewrite the -rule - ;-:~itself.
(1974),

In-Monge v. Beeke Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549
~he

plaintiff claimed that her discharge had resulted-

from her:;:' foreman , s hostility towards her because she refused to
go out with him.

--

She sued for damages for breach-of her oral

contract of emp1oyment.- The New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled

,

. : ..•.

I-
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"employer has long ruled the workplace with an "iron hand" by
reason of Woods rule, and that "courts cannot ignore the new
climate

prevai~ing

generally in the relationship of employer and

c

employee".

':he court stated a new standard to govern discharge

cases:
"We hold that a termination by the employer
of a contract of employment at will which is
motivated by bad faith or malice or based on
retaliation is not in the best interest of
the economic system or the public good and
constitutes a breach of the employment contract ••• Such a rule affords the employee
a certain stability of employment and does
not interfere with the employer's normal
exercise of his right to discharge, which is
necessary to permit him to operate his
business efficiently and profitably.
II

The court'in Monge, unlike' Wood's rule, balanced the
interest of the employer against the interest of the employee
to arrive at the public interest.

Stated the court:

"In all employment contracts, whether at
will or for a definite term, the employer's
interest in ~unning his business as he sees
fit must be balanced against the interest
'of the employee in maintaining his employment, and the public's interest in maintaining a proper balance' between the two."
Another court to reformulate Wood's rule was the Massacuhsetts
Judicial' Court in Fortune v. National Cash, Register, 364 N. E •. 2d
1251 (1977).
~inated

In Fortune, a sixty-one year old salesman was

shortly after he cO!'lpleted arrangements .for a 5 million..

dollar sale of cash'registers.
,

He brought an action for unpaid"

".'

sales commissions.
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Al though "the company had paid Fortune the
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portio~

of the commission due under the literal terms of his

contract, Fortune alleged that his empioyer terminated his
employment to avoid paying him additional amounts that would
have become d~e under·the contract.

The jury found that the

!

company had acted in bad faith in terminating the employment.
The issue on appeal was whether the at-will contract was breached
by this bad faith termination.
The Supreme Judicial Court noted that under traditional
law and under the express terms of the contract, the company
clearly could have terminated Fortune

wit~out

cause, and that

he had received all the commissions to which the contract
entitled him •. Nevertheless, the court agreed with Fortune that,
despite the express terms of the contract, he was entitled to
a jury determination as to the company's motives in terminating
his employment.

The court held that Fortune's contract con-

tract contained an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a termination not made in good faith constitutes a -.

"': •. >'}>

breach of the contract.

,

~.

,

,

~~.~.~.'

The court found authority for its decision in the uniform'

I
!

commercial code, stating:
"[W]e are merely recognizing the general
requirement in this commonwealth that parties
.to contracts and commercial transactions '
~'must act in good faith towards one another.
Good faith and fair'dealing between parties
are pervasive requirements in our law; it
can be said fairly, that parties to con- .
tracts or commercial transactions are bound·
by this standard. II
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TBis analysis shows how the various branches of government
react to unfairness.
The fallacy

of:~

No one would argue that Woods law was fair.

its inception was that it assumed equal bargaining

j

strength betw~en employer and employee.

Based on that faulty

assumption, it assumed that if the parties wanted the employment
to last for a longer period of time, they would have indicated
that in the contract of employment.
The underlying' fallacy' of this argument was probably highlighted by the provision in .collective bargaining agreements'
forbidding termination for other than good cause.
such agreements showed the harshness of Woods
Even'

~hough

Moreover,

rule.

the harshness' of Woods law is quite evident,

it is amazing how the market place through collective bargaining,
the' legislative branch of government, and. the judiciary' all
reacted differently to Woods rule.
The legislative' branch, as pressure groups gained political
power, responded to the'individual groups by tryi~g' to cure.
their individual'problems'~

The judiciary, while circumscribed

by prec.edent, used the old concept that you must come to the
court'with clean hands.

And the market place' reacted to its

new muscle by declaring that if it does not interfere with 'my
work, you:~:"Should not be' able to"do,' it • .
Although the

collective'bargain-i~g

and legislative approaches

.may in the end bring about the same result, the collective

bargain~

.'. ~

ing approach is less bureaucratic.
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Although the judiciary has responded to the problem in a
les's sweeping way than the other two, the judiciary approach
does'nt appeaf to be too far from declaring that one has a

f

property rigtit in the job.

If the judicia~y so declares, it

will only be reflecting what the legislative branch and collective bargaining are already saying more subtly.
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